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GOD AND THE SOCIALLY LOCATED SUBJECT: 
A PROCESS FRAMEWORK FOR 
POSTSTRUCTURAL FEMINISM 
Sarah Heaner Lancaster 
Feminist theology has found poststructural postmodernism to be a helpful 
tool for criticizing false universals and for understanding the unique per-
spectives of different groups of women. This philosophical framework, 
though, is not by itself able to support the claims for justice that feminist 
theology needs to make. This paper explores the possibility of using 
process philosophy as an alternative framework because it preserves many 
of the insights of poststructural postmodernism while at the same time pro-
viding an ontology that can ground justice claims. 
Theology frequently mines the resources of philosophy for its insights into 
human nature, and one of the most fruitful philosophical discussions at the 
current time, especially for feminism, involves theories of the socially locat-
ed self in poststructuralism. Feminist and other theologies which claim to 
speak from some specific perspective have found in the idea of socialloca-
tion a way of explaining why their perspectives are different from those of 
dominant theology and a way of challenging the perspective of dominant 
theology. While it has led to important insights, this appropriation of post-
structuralism in feminist theology has not been without criticism. In some 
crucial ways, poststructuralist theory falls short of accomplishing what 
feminists need to accomplish because it is difficult to ground claims about 
justice in a theory that tends toward relativism. Feminist theologians have 
increasingly recognized the need for norms in making justice claims, and 
poststructuralism is not by itself adequately equipped to provide them. In 
fact, poststructuralism even makes talk about God problematic by its radi-
cal severing of language and reality. Despite its stark skepticism about 
ontology, poststructural feminist theology needs a metaphysical frame-
work. The question of which metaphysics to use, though, is crucial in 
order to preserve the insights of poststructuralism. In this article, I will 
explore both the promise and the problems that arise when feminist theol-
ogy makes use of poststructuralism. Toward this end, I will look especially 
at Mary McClintock Fulkerson's book Changing the Subject: Women's 
Discourses and Feminist Theology in order to explore the implications of post-
structural theory for her own convictions as a feminist. Then I will suggest 
that process philosophy may be able to provide what poststructuralism by 
itself lacks, namely, a description of reality in which those convictions may 
indeed have force. 
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I. Feminist Theology and Poststructuralism 
Because I will be defending the use of metaphysics in theology, I need to 
address briefly how metaphysics has fallen into disfavor in recent years. It 
is typical of postmodernism in general, and poststructuralism in particular, 
to reject modernity's claims to universal truth. That which is held to be 
universal turns out over and over again to be a historically and socially 
conditioned idea masquerading as a timeless truth. According to this criti-
cism, modern thinking tends to universalize its particular experiences; it 
takes particularly situated characteristics of people and things and builds 
general theories around them. These theories are typically "essentialist," in 
that they take socially conditioned qualities to be "natural," and project 
them onto all people.! Following Lyotard's criticism of "grand narratives," 
any attempt to speak of general theories, especially metaphysical theories 
about the whole of reality, is suspect.2 These general theories yield "false 
universals." They claim to be speaking of truths that hold in all times and 
places, but that claim cannot be supported. It is revealed to be false as pre-
viously suppressed voices indicate that their experiences are quite different 
from the ones that have been universalized. 
Poststructuralism pushes this insight in the direction of language and 
power, even to the extent of denying any necessary com1ection to extra-lin-
guistic reality. It takes seriously Derrida's criticism of metaphysics as an 
attempt to find "substance" that is truly "present" and which consequently 
can supply us with security.3 Instead, it shows how our own language 
actually constructs reality, including our very selves, and how this lan-
guage is invested with power interests." Furthermore, the "reality" con-
structed by language is not inherently stable but is always in some kind of 
flux. "General theories," then, are not simply false universals. They are 
constructions that take place in a specific "social location," built in a partic-
ular language that reflects particular power interests. Any attempt to 
speak generally about the world is criticized for being ahistorical, that is, 
for denying its place in and dependence upon history, and atemporal, that 
is, for attempting to speak of timeless truths that are unchanging and can 
somehow be known objectively.5 Such an enterprise is inevitably a failure 
because the humans who create the theories are timebound, historical, and 
socially located creatures. 
Precisely this criticism of universalizing tendencies has made poststruc-
turalism such a useful tool for feminist theologians, although it took some 
time to discover this possibility. Feminist theology had initially taken aim 
at dominant theology produced by males, with the stinging criticism that it 
did not include "women's experience." Male theologians had taken male 
experience and generalized it to the entire human race, and feminist the-
ologians stated clearly and definitively that the assumptions and claims of 
male theologians were misapplied to women. While not entirely left 
behind, this tactic has had to be refined. As more and more women found 
their own voices to speak about their own experiences, it became clear that 
"women's experience" itself was a generalization that could not be main-
tained. Women of color have pointed out that feminist theology written by 
white, middle class women does not in fact reflect the experiences of 
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women who are not white and middle class. At about the same time that 
women of color were criticizing the parochialism of feminist theology, 
postmodern theory, which challenged the possibility of universal theories, 
became a force in theology. Feminist scholars began to realize that feminist 
theology had unwittingly adopted the theoretical framework of male the-
ology even as it criticized the substance. Feminist theology began to "turn 
to the French," or to make use of the postmodern ideas promoted by 
French philosophers, in order to continue its criticism of dominant theolo-
gy more adequately, while at the same time honoring the experiences of all 
women.6 By calling attention to the sociallocatedness of all theology, femi-
nist theologians could continue to question the generalizations made by 
dominant male theology and yet also seek to avoid making similarly inap-
propriate generalizations themselves. 
As useful as this tool could be for feminist theologians, though, post-
structuralism was not without its problems. Even as feminists began to 
explore the promise of poststructuralism for advancing women's concerns, 
some were hesitant to embrace the postmodern project wholeheartedly.' 
In 1990, Feminism/Postmodernism, which urged feminist use of postmodern 
thought, contained also several essays that pointed out possible pitfalls, 
particularly the problem of relativism.8 Since that time, the use of post-
structuralism in feminist theology is still being debated. While some femi-
nist theologians initially embraced relativism, arguing that truth is a matter 
of power, others have been reluctant to follow poststructuralism or other 
forms of postmodernism to the point of giving up norms." Where the need 
for norms has been recognized, though, feminist theologians have largely 
avoided a return to general theories, and in particular metaphysics. lO 
Frequently, they seek pragmatic or historicist standards rather than onto-
logical onesY While I agree that our historical and social conditionedness 
must be recognized fully, I want to suggest that even historicized norms 
have to be grounded to some extent in "the way things are" if they are 
themselves to provide adequate grounding for justice issues. Questions 
about ontology, then, cannot simply be left to the side. To show why this 
is so, I will explore briefly the way that Mary McClintock Fulkerson uti-
lizes poststructuralism in her approach to theology. She is a good candi-
date for this exploration because she is aware of and wants to avoid the 
problems of total relativism without returning to essentialist theories. Her 
work is typical, then, of much feminist theology at the present time. 
II. Fulkerson: Changing the Subject 
The title of Fulkerson's book, Changing the Subject, refers to her attempt to 
wrestle with the problem of feminist theology's appeal to "women's expe-
rience." In recognition of the diversity of experiences actual women have, 
Fulkerson wants to change the "subject" of feminist theology from a gener-
al idea of "woman" to the real multiplicity of concrete women. Feminist 
theology has appealed to "women's experience" to expose and undermine 
the use of male experience as universal, but the "experience" to which it 
appeals is a prelinguistic intuition of God that does not take into account 
the different social locations in which women's concrete experiences take 
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shape.12 To accomplish this change, Fulkerson proposes the use of post-
structuralist theory, which can thus allow feminism to focus on the way in 
which multiple identities are produced in multiple social locations. 
Poststructuralism, according to Fulkerson, builds on the insights of 
structuralism, a theory of language that points out that signs derive their 
meaning from their place in a language system. She notes that the relation 
between signifier and signified, and even the relation between signs them-
selves, has a certain arbitrariness about itY Signs are what they are by con-
vention, not by nature. Poststructuralism pushes this insight further, 
beyond language to all forms of meaning. It sees language as but one of 
many sign systems; others could include fashion or advertising, where 
objects or actions rather than words take on meanings. None of these sign 
systems have any "natural" connection to reality. They are conventional 
constructions of our world, and we cannot get behind them to some fur-
ther "reality." Because our reality is "constructed" rather than "natura!," it 
can be "deconstructed" and then "reconstructed," and indeed poststruc-
turalism claims that sign systems are always in some sort of flux. One sig-
nifying pattern will come into contact with another signifying pattern, so 
that as Fulkerson says, "there are always openings, fissures, and intersec-
tions" such that no system is completely closed.14 Even though there may 
be a dominant signifying pattern, it coexists with other, subordinate signi-
fying patterns. ll1ese other patterns are capable of destabilizing the domi-
nant one, and it is this possibility for destabilizing meaning systems that 
holds promise for feminism to dismantle the dominant patriarchal one. 
One of the implications of poststructural theory is that the "self" is a "con-
structed" reality. Just as we have no access to our world apart from our con-
structions of reality, we have no access to some "J" that lies beyond language 
(construed broadly to include multiple kinds of sign systems). There is no 
all-seeing, unified entity that somehow escapes the influence of signification, 
no "self" that exists prior to its engagement with the social codes of the com-
munity. For this reason, a prelinguistic intuition of God is impossible. 
Rather, discourse constructs subjects. All objects in our world, including 
human selves, are constituted as real for us in the way that we define them, 
and we define them according to their relation to other socially significant 
things. Fulkerson does not believe that affirming the constructed character 
of the subject leads to denying agency or individuality; she simply wants to 
say that we are who we are because of our relations in a system (or systems) 
of meaning. Any" subject" is "coded," or constructed linguistically by all the 
discourses in which it participates. The interests of the subject are shaped by 
the interests that are already represented by the discourses in which the sub-
ject becomes a subject. That is, what the subject "knows" or cares about, 
what produces conflict, what is desired-all these interests become the inter-
ests of the subject through participation in a discourse that highlights the rel-
evance of these things. Even though an individual may have a certain inter-
est or knowledge, that interest or knowledge is grounded in social condi-
tions-including economic, political, civic, and cultural conditions-so that 
the knowledge or interest that the individual has is socially produced. IS 
Thus, the subject is produced by its social location; it becomes what it is 
because it is located in this particular network of meanings. 
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If the subject is produced by its social location, then feminism serves 
women well not when it looks to some universal experience but when it 
examines the discourses in which women are produced. To show how 
important this move is for feminism, Fulkerson uses poststructural analy-
sis to show how women read the Bible to resist patriarchy. Fulkerson 
understands the Bible to be an unstable text with no fixed meaning. The 
"text" comes into being as it is interpreted within the discourse of a com-
munity. A Christian community that reads the Bible as scripture stabilizes 
the text through practices of reading that both emerge from and serve the 
interests of that community. A community, however, can have a number 
of discourses within it. There is a dominant discourse, which aims at an 
"ideal" reading to serve the interests that are present in the dominant dis-
course, but there are also other, nonofficial discourses which may resist the 
ideal reading and which may engender alternative readings that serve the 
interests of the subordinate discourse. Women are constructed as subjects 
by both kinds of discourse. They are constructed by the dominant dis-
course to accept their place in the social system, even though it is oppres-
sive; and they are constructed by the subordinate discourse to resist that 
very oppression. The ways that they resist are shaped by both the bound-
aries and the openings in the dominant discourse. 
This shift from experience to discourse enables Fulkerson to acknowledge 
how texts that white academic feminists reject as patriarchal can be a source 
of strength for women of very different backgrounds. Fulkerson explores in 
her book three resisting regimes among Presbyterian Women, Pentecostal 
women, and academic feminists. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus 
on her description of Pentecostal women because her examination of this 
group highlights the important points of her work for my argument. She 
describes the use of scripture by Pentecostal women in marginalized eco-
nomic communities, a group that is constituted quite differently than the 
middle class Presbyterian women of whom she herself is a part. Although 
her own reading of certain scripture passages would diverge from the read-
ings these Pentecostal women perform, she accepts that they find these pas-
sages to be joyful and exhilarating. Her task is to discover why it is that 
these women can find joy and strength in passages that would be considered 
oppressive by other women. Pentecostal women share certain rules for 
reading scripture that come from the dominant discourse of their communi-
ty, such as that the Bible is inerrant, that it is the inspired word of God, and 
that academic methods of interpretation are to be deliberately avoided. 
These rules provide restraints that keep Pentecostal women from being able 
to interpret the Bible in the way that Protestant academic feminists would. 
On the other hand, the rules of the dominant discourse in their community 
also allow for diverse interpretations that are led by the Holy Spirit. This 
rule creates an openness for subordinate discourses to supply alternative 
interpretations to the ones offered by the dominant discourse. Fulkerson 
demonstrates several ways in which women have been able to resist restric-
tions that are placed on them in their communities by their gender because 
they have been able to defend their actions and interpretations of scripture as 
having been led by the Holy Spirit. For instance, when their call to preach 
has been challenged by the explicit Biblical charge that they should be sub-
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missive to men, they have been able to argue, using the dominant discourse, 
that their fundamental requirement is to submit to God.16 They have found 
ways to resist certain restrictions that have been placed on them by their 
community's understanding of gender roles. Feminists can recognize the 
kind of meaning that this resistance has when they become attentive to the 
different discourses that have constructed the subject and the conditions in 
which the resistance takes place. 
The promise of Fulkerson's work for enabling feminist theology to 
speak more accurately about concrete women in vastly different social 
locations is great, but the theory she has used does not fully support all her 
concerns. At several points throughout her book, Fulkerson is aware of the 
problems of relativism that are associated with poststructuralist theory. To 
claim that language is constitutive of reality is to raise a host of questions 
about the nature of reality and our access to it. Fulkerson clearly states that 
she does not want to give up on the "givenness" of things. She is not call-
ing into question the "thatness," or the existence, of things; but she wants 
to explore instead the "whatness," or what she calls the "being," of things.'7 
That is, she wants to examine how some" givenness" becomes meaningful 
when it is construed in a certain way. A body, for instance, can be con-
strued in scientific, discursive totality as cells, blood vessels, muscles, etc., 
or it can be construed very differently in the discursive totality of a loving, 
personal relationship. In another example, Fulkerson describes different 
ways in which the physical act of "forced penile-vaginal intercourse per-
formed by a male on his female spouse" may be construed.'s The given-
ness of the physical act may be construed as rape or as legal marital sexual 
relations, depending on various discursive factors, such as when and 
where the judgment takes place or who makes the judgment. Prior to the 
20th century and the emergence of a feminist community, she says, the 
construal of the act as rape was not possible. The "reality" of marital rape 
did not exist. The meaning that is read onto such an act, or onto bodies or 
anything else that is given, is entirely a function of the discourse in which 
the act happens. It is the meaning that is read onto givenness, not the 
givenness itself, that Fulkerson wants to show is unstable. 
But even on the level of meaning, Fulkerson is unwilling to follow lan-
guage theory to the point of saying that meaning is entirely arbitrary. Just 
as she wants to avoid closed systems of meaning that cannot allow for 
reconstruction, she also wants to avoid completely undifferentiated fields 
of discourse that belongs to deconstructionism. Instead, she wants a posi-
tion "somewhere between" the two. TlLough she does not say what those 
respects are, Fulkerson does say "for a feminist theological analysis, mean-
ing is in some crucial respects not arbitrary at al1."'9 It seems that 
Fulkerson has an awareness that feminism is not served by complete rela-
tivism. Her point is not to do away with the foundation of all reality or all 
ideas, but rather to find a way to criticize and destabilize a dominant pat-
tern of meaning. Poststructural theory gives her a way of accounting for 
openings, for cracks, for breaks in the dominant network that allow entry 
to the alternatives that subordinate discourse can supply. 
The question, then, is whether Fulkerson succeeds in finding her way 
between closed systems and complete relativism. Repeatedly, Fulkerson 
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denies that we can talk about reality, knowledge, or truth in any way that 
escapes from the systems of meaning in which we are already engaged. 
There is no pure, direct access to reality, knowledge, or truth. She makes 
statements that press this insight to its fullest extent; for instance, she says, 
"Knowledge is not tainted by interest: it is interest." She also argues against 
being able to test truth claims against reality itself.") Fulkerson does not 
deny that truth exists any more than she denies that reality exists. Her 
point is that we have no access to truth outside of communal discourses, 
which are laden with power and interest to the extent that she can even 
say, "in any dominant discourse the terms of truth (that is, what counts as 
true) are defined by the discourse."2l The dominant, or certifying, dis-
course does not create the reality (the givenness) of things, but it establish-
es the boundaries of what is thinkable and meaningful. She does not deny 
all knowledge of truth but denies that we have a "God's-eye view" of the 
truth. Fulkerson borrows an image from David Toole to speak of truth 
"like the flash of a fish on your line."n We get glimpses of it as it surfaces 
and recedes. It is real and alluring, but we do not possess it. In keeping 
with her desire to avoid closure on the semiotic process, Fulkerson says 
that the test for truth is not coherence with other ideas or correspondence 
to reality. Instead, truth is recognized "in that by which we are persuad-
ed."23 The truth of the "reasons, rules, and values" of a community is tied 
to "the visions of the good (however temporary) that come from communi-
ties, their traditions, and the practices they produce."'· There can be no cer-
tainty, but once persuaded of the truth of a vision, commitment to certain 
beliefs and actions is worth a wager. 
Let us consider, though, where this reticence to move beyond semiotic 
processes leaves Fulkerson on several points. There are three problems 
that she faces as a feminist that poststructural theory is ill equipped to help 
her handle. First, consider her two examples of how the givenness of reali-
ty may be construed in different ways. In the first, the construal of a body 
as cells or as a loved one, the givenness is neutral and the construals are 
equally appropriate for their situations. The second, though-the given-
ness of forced coitus between husband and wife-is somewhat different. 
Fulkerson rightly points out that prior to this century, such an act could 
not be legally construed as rape. The question remains, though, whether 
the act is in fact rape regardless of its being construed in such a way or not. 
Her own description of the act includes the element of force. Does she 
mean to say that intercourse forced on a wife by her husband was not a 
violation of the wife prior to this century? It is one thing to say that it was 
not recognized as such; it is quite another to say that it was not such in fact. 
If she is committed to the neutrality of any givenness, then Fulkerson can-
not say that the physical act she describes was indeed a violation of the 
woman, regardless of what the legal system said about it. One would 
think, though that her commitment to feminism would lead her to say that 
the act violates the woman prior to the consciousness-raising of this centu-
ry. Indeed, she does say that such an act, even construed as legal marital 
relations, produces the woman as a "nonperson" or an "embarrassing dis-
turber of the sanctity of the private realm."'s She makes a negative judg-
ment of some sort about the act even when she tries to work within the 
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construal that was appropriate for the time. It seems that the act is not alto-
gether neutral givenness in the way that a body by itself might be. The 
poststructural theory that Fulkerson adopts, though, does not provide the 
kind of nuance necessary to distinguish between the two. 
Second, consider where Fulkerson's theory leaves her regarding her 
own deepest commitments. She wants to say that we do not value apart 
from discourse, and that we do not know truth apart from communal 
practices. What is "good" and what is "evil," and consequently what is 
"true" and "false" or "right" and "wrong," are deternlined by communal 
discourse. Among the things that Fulkerson considers to be true are 
assertions for which she does not argue, such as that God exists, that God 
is a liberating God, that sexism is evil, and that tl1e well-being of women 
is a good to be sought after. Those are precisely the kinds of assertions, 
however, which are thrown open to question by her theory. Fulkerson 
admits that she cannot say anything with certainty but can only wager on 
the truth of which she has been persuaded. Her theory can say no more 
than that beliefs are true because they are persuasive. The problem is 
that many things are persuasive to many people. What counts as persua-
sive depends on how people have been produced by the discourses in 
which they find themselves. She clearly believes that not all discourses 
are equal-a discourse that promotes women's well-being is preferable to 
a discourse that does not-but she has no recourse for deciding among 
them unless she appeals to something outside of discourse itself, an 
option that she just as clearly denies herself. Granted, she sometimes 
speaks of truth as independent of discourse when she says it is glimpsed 
from time to time. Still, one only knows that one has glimpsed truth by 
its persuasiveness, and the problem of what is persuasive is exactly what 
is at issue. She has no way of countering "truth" that is radically differ-
ent from hers (for instance that God or sexism does not exist) but equally 
persuasive to those who believe it. 
Third, consider the implications of Fulkerson's description of how the 
subject is produced for the way God works in the human life. Fulkerson 
criticizes any prelinguistic intuition of the divine. There can be no experi-
ence, not even experience of the divine, that stands apart from the lan-
guage that produces us. Fulkerson does not, however, give an accOLmt of 
how God might work any other way. Her theory places the production of 
the self, with possibilities for oppression and resistance, entirely in social 
relations. Subjects are constructed by discourse, discourse is a humanly 
manufactured system of meaning, and the subject cannot reach beyond 
discourse to reality itself. How does God, then, participate in the produc-
tion of the self? Simply to identify God with social processes amounts to 
severe reductionism. To distinguish God from those social processes, 
though, is to raise the question about our relationship to reality outside 
those processes. To see why this question is important, remember that 
Fulkerson argues that women are produced by social processes in such a 
way that they both accept and resist oppression. It is hard to imagine that 
she would want to say that God is working in both cases, but her theory 
does not allow her to make the kinds of distinctions necessary to involve 
God in one process but not the other.26 
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Fulkerson's work is important for showing how women resist oppres-
sion in very different ways, and she is right to remind feminists to 
acknowledge those unfamiliar forms of resistance and to refrain from say-
ing that all women should think and act alike. Still, at least part of what is 
required for liberation is the recognition of sin by those who are not 
already persuaded by the femu,ist vision. To accomplish what she wants 
to accomplish, Fulkerson needs to be able to transcend the very social 
processes that have proved to be so illuminating, without voiding the 
illsights that she has gained from poststructuralist theory. It is here that I 
believe process philosophy can be of some assistance. 
III. Process and Postmodernism 
One of the major contributions that process philosophy made to Christian 
theology initially was to provide a metaphysical framework in which 
claims about the human self could be understood. In the early years of 
"process theology," existentialist philosophy had already made a great 
impact on the Christian understanding of the self ill its relation to God. 
Existentialist philosophy, however, was highly subjective. It could speak 
of "decision" and "authentic life," but it had no way of pointing beyond 
human experience to an objective reality to which human life was respon-
sible. Both Schubert M. Ogden and John B. Cobb, Jr. saw this problem and 
used the understanding of reality provided by process philosophy to sup-
port Christian appropriation of existentialist philosophy at its weakest 
poillt. In one piece, Cobb explored the ethical question of how there can be 
"oughtness" in human decisions. 27 Similarly, Ogden supplemented 
Bultmann's existentialist analysis of humanity with Hartshorne's meta-
physical analysis of God.28 For both, process philosophy provided a crucial 
corrective to an illsightful philosophical understandillg that tended to one-
sided understandillg of the reality ill which we live. 
It seems to me that the current philosophical and theological climate is 
quite similar. Existentialist philosophy is no longer domillant, and instead 
postmodernism (ill various forms) is the philosophy which provides the 
most illcisive criticism of the status quo and the most promise for new ideas. 
Fulkerson has used one form of postmodern thought, namely poststructural-
ism, to illumine features of women's existence that have previously gone 
unnoticed. The value of such an enterprise cannot be denied, but the prob-
lems that remaill are serious enough to warrant further attention. Like the 
existentialism of an earlier generation of theologians, postmodem thought 
tends toward examining how humans make meaning of some sort. It can 
offer profound insight into the processes by which we interact with each 
other and with our world, but it does not have the apparatus to ground its 
criticisms of the way we live ill anything other than its own discourse, which 
by its own way of thinkillg can be neither better nor worse than any other 
discourse. Feminist theology needs an alternative philosophical framework, 
and my suggestion is that process philosophy is an option that should be 
explored. Just as Cobb and Ogden used process philosophy as a corrective 
to the one-sidedness of existentialism, feminist theology may be able to use 
process philosophy as a corrective to the one-sidedness of postmodernism. 
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Process philosophy, of course, is not the only way one can counter prob-
lems of relativism. Other philosophies explore ways of deciding among 
truth claims. I would not rule out feminist dialogue with these other theo-
ries, but process philosophy has some advantages that make it suited to the 
current challenge that lies before feminist theology itself to acknowledge 
different perspectives among different groups of women. Feminist theolo-
gy will find it difficult to make use of any philosophical approach to truth 
that displays the "universalizing tendencies" about which feminists have 
learned to be suspicious. While feminist theology needs some kind of pub-
lic agreement in order to make justice claims, it will be cautious toward 
and critical of any effort to get to agreement without a sufficient account-
ing of why we have differences in the first place. Discussions about per-
spective, for instance whether Venus should be called the morning star or 
the evening star, do not go to the heart of the differences feminists see and 
care about. Nor can disagreements be accounted for simply by acknowl-
edging error that can be corrected by better reasoning. For it to be useful to 
feminists, any attempt to talk about truth will have to have a way of 
accounting for the deep investments we have in things other than truth, 
such as power, and the way those investments shape our understanding. 
It will also, though, have to provide a way to avoid being completely deter-
mined by those investments so that we are simply left with our disagree-
ments, in the way that poststructuralism seems to do. Process philosophy 
has elements that enable us to speak about the complexity of our differ-
ences, but it also maintains a concern for testing truth claims against reali-
ty. Furthermore, it offers a way of valuing reality that becomes important 
for grounding justice claims, which are fundamental to feminist theology. 
In the remainder of this paper, 1 will try to show why process philosophy 
is an appropriate partner for feminist thinking that has been influenced by 
postmodernism, and I will suggest some specific ways in which I believe it 
can serve to undergird the weaknesses of Fulkerson's theory in particular. 
In the introduction to Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy, 
David Ray Griffin suggests that Alfred North Whitehead and Charles 
Hartshorne, among others, may be considered postmodern because they 
attempt to go beyond the modem, but their form of postmodernism differs 
from the common understanding.29 "Postmodem" has become almost syn-
onymous with" deconstruction" because the suspicion of modernity has so 
often extended to the most basic presuppositions of modem thinking, 
including rationality, truth as correspondence, and even empirical given-
ness itself. Postmodernism in this sense has taken aim not only at particular 
aspects of the modem worldview, but even at the very idea of constructing 
a world view at all.") In contrast, the kind of philosophy that Griffin wants 
to highlight does not aim at doing away with the very idea of talking about 
reality in a reasonably accurate way, but works instead to construct a 
worldview that provides an interpretation superior to the modem world-
view that it criticizes. For this reason, Griffin calls this philosophy "con-
structive" postmodernism instead of "deconstructive." Like other forms of 
postmodernism, it shares the insight that human knowledge is fallible and 
that no instance of human thinking has an all-inclusive perspective on reali-
ty; but it has resources that deconstructive postmodernism does not for 
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avoiding complete relativism. Furthermore, even though it speaks general-
ly about the whole of reality, it can acknowledge the impact of social forces 
upon us. Unlike the metaphysics that Derrida criticized, process philoso-
phy does not seek "substance" but explores relationality. Process philoso-
phy, as an instance of constructive postmodernism, may be able to affirm 
Fulkerson's insights but also support her project ontologically. 
As we have seen, although Fulkerson does not deny the" givenness" of 
reality, the theory she uses doesn't provide her a way of dealing with this 
givenness as anything other than a neutral "something" onto which we 
attach meaning. 1 have tried to show that this inability to talk about given-
ness in a more direct way leaves her in an awkward position as a feminist 
with regard to her own example of forced intercourse between husband 
and wife. She takes the act to be negative even though the theory she uses 
cannot by itself explain why she should do so. Furthermore, her theory 
does not provide grounding for her most fundamental convictions. We do 
not "know" things as they really are but as we want or need them to be, 
and even though we can glimpse truth, we cannot test it by correspon-
dence or coherence to be certain that what we "know" is "true." Instead, 
we can only be persuaded of the truth of our convictions. She cannot, then, 
justify through her theory alone why her convictions about God, sexism, 
etc., are superior to convictions that hold just the opposite of her view. At 
least two things are needed to address these problems. First, one needs 
some way of connecting our ideas and judgments to reality so that we can 
speak truly about the ways things are; and second, one needs some frame-
work that is adequate to the way things are in order to talk about moral 
values. 
According to Griffin, Whitehead was also suspicious of axiomatic cer-
tainties that could be known independently of other knowledge and from 
which other propositions could be deduced in a straightforward way. 
Even though he held that assertions about reality required elaboration and 
testing against an accurate apprehension of the metaphysical background 
of the universe itself, Whitehead called language "elliptical, requiring a 
leap of the imagination to understand its meaning in its relevance to imme-
diate experience." 31 Whitehead understands the limits, and one might 
even say the constructed nature, of language and knowledge; but he also 
maintains regard for at least some degree of accuracy in our comprehen-
sion. As he elaborates the implications of Whitehead's position, Griffin 
explains that it is important to distinguish between holding that truth 
means corresponding to reality and holding that any particular proposition 
actually does correspond to reality. One may endorse the idea that all 
truth claims are made from some perspective, and one may exercise appro-
priate suspicion with regard to perspectival truth claims, without giving 
up the conviction that the truth of any perspectival claim depends on the 
accuracy of its description. Griffin says: 
But to believe that a certain assertion about something is true does 
not entail that it is the truth (in the sense of the whole truth), or even 
the most important truth, about it. The full truth about something 
would consist of all the true propositions that apply to it; this full 
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truth, even about something as simple as a molecule or an ant-let 
alone something as complex as a human being or a historical event-
is only knowable to omniscience. Finite minds are capable of only an 
extremely remote approximation to this complete truth.32 
One can agree with Fulkerson that we can only glimpse the truth. We see 
only some aspect of the truth at any given time. But from this humble 
acknowledgment that we can never know the "full truth," it does not fol-
low that knowing truth amounts to persuasion. Whatever truth we man-
age to see must correspond to the aspect of reality that it claims to describe. 
One of the problems with maintaining a commitment to truth as corre-
spondence is the givenness of reality itself. Philosophy has long wrestled 
with the difficulty of establishing that there is a real world which is per-
ceived by our senses. The idea that what we think is given to us from out-
side ourselves is really constructed by the perceiver is at the heart of decon-
structive postmodernism. Griffin shows how Whitehead and Hartshorne 
both approach the problem of givenness in a way that attempts to show 
how the reality of an external world may be supported. The problems 
with sense perception are well known, but Whitehead and Hartshorne 
suggest that our most basic mode of perception is nonsensory. Whitehead 
calls this form of perception "prehension," which Griffin defines as "the 
"non sensory sympathetic perception of antecedent experiences."33 
Whitehead takes the basic units of reality to be not substances but events, 
which he calls "actual occasions" or "occasions of experience." An actual 
occasion prehends antecedent events, that is, it incorporates previous 
events into the event that it is now becoming. This prehension grounds 
direct apprehension of an external world in three ways. First, even 
antecedent events are external to the immediate experience of a particular 
occasion, so the act of prehension on even the most basic level involves a 
direct relation to some reality "outside" the event itself. Second, for com-
plex societies of occasions, such as human beings, the dominant occasion 
prehends the occasions which make up the society. In other words, my 
"soul" or "self" prehends my body. Third, a complex society prehends 
things beyond its body insofar as occasions which comprise the body have 
prehended external data. As Griffin says, "Because all the events (photonic 
and neuronic) connecting the tree I see and my brain are events of this 
type, aspects of the tree itself are present in my brain cells. In prehending 
my brain cells, accordingly, I prehend aspects of the external tree."34 So, 
even sense perception is built on this prehension. But an actual occasion 
does not merely receive events of the past; it also exercises some degree of 
freedom in the way in which those antecedent events are incorporated into 
its actuality. One may recognize, then, an element of "construction" with-
out also denying that nothing is given to the occasion to begin with. At 
high levels of societies of occasions, such as human beings, the freedom is 
great and so the construction is quite significant. Human beings, however, 
do not construct meanings out of nothing. Whitehead and Hartshorne, 
then, work toward showing how the givenness of the world is more than 
simply neutral. While humans have a broad field in which different con-
struals may have bearing, some construals will not conform enough to 
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what is given to be reasonably accurate. Correspondence does not mean 
one-to-one exactness. Rather it means some real connection to the way 
things are that must be taken into account in any adequate construction. 
Among the "givens" that we perceive in a non sensory way are certain 
features of experience itself which we apprehend in a preconceptual way, 
and which count as "knowledge" even before they have been brought to 
conscious expression. This knowledge constitutes a set of beliefs that we 
presuppose in everything we do and say. They are, as Criffin says, "deep 
truths" which are grounded in a deep layer of human experience. We may 
never affirm them through explicit propositions, or we may even deny 
them consciously; but our very existence affirms them even when our 
words and thoughts do not. 33 For example, we all "know" in this deep 
way that we have some freedom and that the future is partially open. To 
be sure, it is possible to develop a theory of complete determinism, but we 
give the lie to that theory every time we struggle with a decision. Among 
the beliefs we presuppose are beliefs in the reality of truth, the past, and an 
ultimate meaning to our lives. Furthermore, all these beliefs depend on 
some whole that exists beyond our individual perspectives or minds. For 
instance, we presuppose an all-inclusive perspective in which complete 
truths may be seen whenever we criticize some perspective as inadequate. 
36 Even if none of us can have, as Fulkerson says, "a Cod's-eye view of the 
world," we presuppose that there is one. 
These "deep truths" need to be distinguished from any propositions 
that would state them, and from any propositions that elaborate the mean-
ing of those deep truths for us. For instance, process philosophy does 
build an understanding of the existence of Cod on these nonsensory per-
ceptions, but that reflective understanding is not identical to the deep expe-
rience upon which it is built. Schubert Ogden, for instance, speaks of a 
"basic faith" that humans share, a "confidence in the abiding worth of our 
life" that can be lived out authentically or inauthentically. "Cod" refers to 
the objective ground in reality for that confidence, and process philosophy 
seeks to articulate an understanding of reality so that God may be con-
ceived intelligibly as the ground of this confidence.37 The concepts, defini-
tions, and arguments that Ogden uses are not the "deep truths" them-
selves. They are explications of the meaning of our confidence, and as 
such, they are subject to criticism, interpretation, elaboration, and alterna-
tive explanations. It is possible to construe this "confidence" differently, 
perhaps as a survival instinct, something that has been selected for in 
nature through evolution. Such an interpretation would not be likely to 
seek for a ground of that confidence in reality itself, much less call it God. 
This alternative explanation, though, in its own way, would display a con-
cern for understanding our confidence in light of the way things really are. 
Even this attempt, then, would depend on an experience of the whole in 
which our lives make sense, and to that extent it would display the "deep 
truths" of our existence even as it would articulate them quite differently. 
How one decides between articulations will depend at least partly on 
which does more justice to the experience itself. At least one can say that 
an explanation that acknowledges and accounts for our presuppositions is 
better than one that does not. None of this makes process philosophy right 
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in all or even any of its claims, but it does suggest that there is an approach 
in process philosophy that is more adequate to our situation than those 
that deny these "deep truths." Process philosophy cannot claim to have 
the perspective that God has, but it can attempt to talk about the whole 
that we constantly presuppose in such a way that we are reminded to take 
it into account. 
Process philosophy, then, affirms that our ideas have some connection 
to the givenness of reality (even if because of our freedom they are also 
partially constructed) and that our most basic experience of that given real-
ity lets us know that not every construction is equal. Givenness is not alto-
gether neutral. It is possible, for instance, to test by correspondence 
whether believing that humans have some degree of freedom is superior to 
believing in determinism. We begin to have a framework in which claims 
about values such as justice can have force, and I will turn now to the 
importance of acknowledging a "God perspective" in making those claims. 
Even before postmodern deconstruction became a major force in theology, 
John Cobb explored the way in which Whitehead's thought could ground 
an idea of "oughtness" in ethics. Confidence in universally applicable 
standards of right and wrong had already been eroded, and even if such 
norms could be found, existentialism had suggested they would be unim-
portant. Only accepting responsibility for one's own actions, not obedi-
ence to external norms, counted as authentic existence.38 In this situation, 
"oughtness" had little meaning. Cobb turned to the idea of prehension to 
show how it could be possible to talk about obligation in such a philosoph-
ical and theological climate. As we have seen, each momentary occasion of 
experience incorporates previous occasions into its own existence, and it 
does so by selectively synthesizing what it prehends into a novel occasion. 
Both givenness and freedom are involved in this process. Cobb suggested 
that in the initial phase of this synthesis, God provides an aim that grounds 
obligation, namely "the aim at the best self-actualization allowed by the sit-
uation of the occasion-best in terms at once of that occasion's own subjec-
tive enjoyment and in terms of what it >\Till contribute to the relevant future 
beyond itself."'" In other words, it has an obligation to synthesize the occa-
sions it prehends so that it contributes in the best possible way to its own 
enjoyment and to the enjoyment of future occasions. The obligation is to 
the "best possible," and consideration of the "best possible" includes occa-
sions beyond itself. Of course, occasions do not always synthesize the 
other occasions they prehend in the best possible way either for themselves 
or for those occasions to which they will contribute. Such a failure may be 
called "sin," but the failure cannot even be recognized as a failure unless 
there is an obligation that has not been fulfilled. Furthermore, the "best 
possible" constitutes a principle; it does not provide a recipe or description 
for the details of any particular synthesis. Every occasion will be unique in 
what it prehends, in what counts as its own enjoyment, and in what counts 
as a good contribution to occasions beyond itself. Finally, because this 
occasion will be prehended by so many other occasions, the contribution it 
makes to others, even beyond its own enduring self, is vastly important. 
We contribute not only to the successive occasions that will constitute 
our own enduring self, and not only to the other enduring occasions that 
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are immediately around us, but also to God. According to Hartshorne, God 
is the ultimate recipient of all our experiences. In numerous works, 
Hartshorne argues that God should be conceived as "surrelative," or 
supremely relative. God's absolute character never changes; God constant-
ly loves us and knows us and acts for us in every way that God can and 
should. But in order to love us, know us, etc., adequately, God must be 
related to us. God is the one and only supreme individual who is related to 
everything that is, who is adequately aware of every occasion of experience, 
and who is the ultimate beneficiary of all actions. Human beings will 
always have limited knowledge of situations, so our response to others can 
never be fully adequate. Not only will we inevitably be ignorant of many 
things, but our "blind spots" may often be more or less willfully created. 
Our investments will shape the way that we use our freedom to interpret 
the situations around us. God, however, suffers from no such ignorance or 
bias. God knows intimately every situation, every action, every subject, so 
God may evaluate every situation, action, or subject in its full concreteness. 
"This ideal relativity," says Hartshorne, "absolute in its immutable adequa-
cy, is the standard of all." Given this ideal, the primary good is "that the 
creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living, and pour this richness into 
the one ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the life of God." The purpose 
of humanity, then, is "to serve and glorify God, that is, literally to contribute 
some value to the divine life which it otherwise would not have." 40 
Since in our finitude we are ignorant of the whole, knowing what will 
contribute the best to the whole, much less what will contribute the best to 
our future occasions or the other occasions around us, is problematic. 
Knowing how to live by this standard is not an easy task. Every statement 
of values, of norms, of rules to live by will suffer from our ignorance of all 
the things that should be considered and the investments that shape what 
we are willing to see. Thus, every humanly constructed value system or 
set of rules is subject to revision in light of fuller information. In process 
then, just as for Fulkerson, no human has or ever will have a "God's eye 
perspective" on anything. But, the commitment to the existence of a God's 
eye perspective to which we are accountable is important for relativizing 
our own finite perspectives. That commitment to the truth of the way 
things really are reminds us to look beyond ourselves, to be willing to open 
our limited perspectives (especially when those limits are willfully chosen) 
so that we may learn from the perspectives of others, to ask what we are 
contributing to a God whose desire is the best for all the creatures. 
Process philosophy, then, attempts to establish a connection with given-
ness that poststructuralism typically avoids; and it also tries to explain how 
making moral claims is justified. Can it also talk about how God works in 
subjects that are produced by social processes? Fulkerson's theory is of 
enormous help in explaining how the experiences of concrete women are 
different from one another and in showing that women's resistance to 
oppression may take various forms. Women resist according to the possi-
bilities that are open to them through the interplay of dominant discourse 
with subordinate discourse. Women are produced by both, and "cracks" 
or "fissures" in meaning that the tension between the two creates provide 
openings for novel performances of scripture. So far, process philosophy is 
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not in conflict with poststructuralism. Occasions prehend the occasions 
that have gone before them, and discourses count in what an arising occa-
sion prehends. Whitehead's term "concrescence," or growing together, 
indicates how the antecedent occasions are carried into and become part of 
the makeup of the arising occasion. In this way, one may indeed say that 
the new occasion is "produced" or "constructed" by what it prehends. A 
subject, then, prehends discourse so that the meanings of this discourse 
become quite literally a part of who she is. Subjects prehend the occasions 
that are relevant to their past, so each subject will prehend different rele-
vant data. Pentecostal women will take into themselves antecedent occa-
sions that are quite different from the occasions prehended by academic 
women. Because of their different social locations, they will concresce in 
different ways. So far, process philosophy supports Fulkerson's insights. 
Process diverges from Fulkerson, though, in two ways. First, an occasion 
(in this case a subject) is not merely the product of the discourses or any-
thing else that it prehends. Each occasion has some element of freedom to 
synthesize past occasions in a novel way. Of course, tension between domi-
nant and subordinate discourse will figure into the possibilities for the 
shape that synthesis will take. One may affirm that the cracks and fissures 
that lie ''between'' discourses are significant for novelty; but each occasion 
also has some degree of freedom to determine just how those cracks and fis-
sures are to be used. Second, social processes are not the only things that 
subjects prehend. God provides an initial aim for each occasion. Although 
this aim is not the product of discourse, and so is perhaps "nonlinguistic" in 
the same way that it is nonsensuous, it is not given to a self that is indepen-
dent of social processes. There is no "Cartesian self" that lies behind social 
processes and somehow knows God independently of them. Rather, the 
"self" is an event, not a substance, which endures through time as a succes-
sion of occasions, each of which come into being as a concrescence of all that 
has gone before plus freely enacted synthesis. This "self" has a nonsensu-
ous awareness of the whole in which it lives and to which it contributes. 
This awareness, although preconceptual, is not given to the" self" indepen-
dently of social processes. Rather, this awareness belongs to every moment 
of the self's existence, to every experience that it may have. God, then, pro-
vides an initial aim along with the social processes that the subject experi-
ences. The aim serves as a principle by which those processes should be 
synthesized in the subject, namely to make the best possible contribution for 
the enjoyment of the arising occasion and all the other occasions that will 
prehend this one. God's influence, then, is distinct from social processes, 
but is not independent of them. God does not work in us independently of 
the discourses that produce us, but God works in us to influence how we 
use our freedom so that neither God's action nor our own selves may be 
reduced to nothing but social processes. 
IV. Conclusion 
Process philosophy shares with poststructuralism a criticism of modernity, 
a recognition that no human perspective can capture the whole truth, and 
an awareness that social location determines much of who we become. 
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Process philosophy adds to poststructuralism, though, an attempt to 
ground truth claims and justice claims ontologically. By taking the insights 
of poststructuralism and process together, feminists can affirm Fulkerson's 
insight, namely, the very different ways in which concrete women who 
have been produced in various social locations resist oppression in their 
contexts. They prehend meanings from the various discourses in which 
they participate and freely use the openings made by the interplay of these 
discourses to synthesize all that is given to them from the past in the best 
possible way. But in addition to affirming varieties of resistance, feminists 
can also make justice claims on the basis of what we all contribute to each 
other and to God. It is not enough to make the best possible use of the sta-
tus quo. We may also call all people to enhance the richness that is possi-
ble for all by living in ways that make better contributions to those around 
us. What we give to others to prehend, whether that may be the meanings 
by which we construct them as nonpersons or concrete resources for living, 
matters for what the "best possible" for them will be. 
Constructive postmodernism recognizes that it is constructing a world-
view that is itself provisional. Process philosophy and theology can no more 
claim to speak the whole truth than can any other philosophy or theology. 
Its claims about correspondence, about non sensory perception, and about 
the existence of God are questions that remain open; but it provides a direc-
tion for asking certain questions that is quite different from that of other 
postmodem discussions. Process philosophy is itself discourse and should 
never forget its own limits, nor does it do all that needs to be done in order to 
confront the actual problems of concrete women and men. What it can 
claim, though, is to offer a worldview that is superior both to that of moder-
nity and to that of any view that leads to relativism. It can provide a crucial 
ontological framework for the work that remains. Process attempts to show 
that there is a whole to which we are accountable and that it matters what 
kind of contribution we make to that whole and to the parts (human and 
nonhuman) which make it up, but the question of what actual contributions 
we ought to make must be worked through. To do so adequately, according 
to the insights of process philosophy itself, all voices must be heard and 
taken into account. The God of process thought, who knows us in our con-
creteness and who wants each of us to live richly, requires that we make use 
of all resources that can bring those voices to expression, including feminist 
use of poststructural theory. Only when we hear the needs of those around 
us will we know how to contribute wisely and appropriately to others and 
thus how to make our best possible contribution to God. 
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